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Abstract Economic evaluations are increasingly used to
inform decisions regarding the allocation of scarce health
care resources. To systematically incorporate societal
preferences into these evaluations, quality-adjusted life
year gains could be weighted according to some equity
principle, the most suitable of which is a matter of frequent
debate. While many countries still struggle with equity
concerns for priority setting in health care, the Netherlands
has reached a broad consensus to use the concept of pro-
portional shortfall. Our study evaluates the concept and its
support in the Dutch health care context. We discuss
arguments in the Netherlands for using proportional
shortfall and difficulties in transitioning from principle to
practice. In doing so, we address universal issues leading to
a systematic consideration of equity concerns for priority
setting in health care. The article thus has relevance to all
countries struggling with the formalization of equity con-
cerns for priority setting.
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Introduction
Economic evaluations are increasingly used to inform
decisions regarding the allocation of scarce health care
resources. They generally take the form of cost-utility
analysis, in which incremental costs per gained QALY
(quality-adjusted life year) are evaluated against some
threshold to ascertain the intervention’s value for money.
In this procedure, QALY gains are (implicitly) valued
equally irrespective of, for instance, the beneficiary or
disease. Such practice has been an issue of debate, how-
ever, because accumulating evidence shows that the public
may prefer some QALY gains over others (e.g., young over
old) [1–3], often relating to a more equitable distribution of
health and health care. Such notions of equity are normally
not captured in economic evaluations where QALYs are
typically weighted equally and often remain implicit in
subsequent policy decisions, if included at all.
Almost three decades ago, researchers recognized that
equity concerns could be incorporated into allocation
decisions in the health care sector by weighting QALY
gains according to some agreed upon equity principle [4],
such as giving more weight to gains in the severely ill.
Nonetheless, explicit QALY weighting is still uncommon.
It seems that little has changed since Schwappach’s [2]
assertion that equity weighting, if considered at all, was at a
developmental stage. However, given the growing pressure
on health care budgets—partly due to (expensive) new
technologies and increased demand stemming from
demographic changes—we can expect that the process of
allocating scarce health care resources will require
increasing attention. Since decision makers increasingly
use economic evaluations to inform their decisions [5], the
discrepancies between recommendations based on eco-
nomic evaluation outcomes and actual or publicly desired
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decisions may become more evident, as experienced in the
UK, Netherlands, and Australia [6–9]. One explanation for
such discrepancies is the presence of equity concerns that
are insufficiently reflected in current economic evaluations
[10]. Therefore, we need a more explicit and systematic
incorporation of equity weights to obtain sustainable
decisions.
Recent developments in the UK with respect to the funding
of costly life-prolonging drugs illustrate the attention to equity
concerns [11, 12]. In general, the National Institute for Health
and Clinical Excellence (NICE) appears to adhere to the
principle that ‘a QALY is a QALY,’ implying that all QALY
gains should receive equal weight [13], but under that rule, it
appears to have been difficult to come to sustainable decisions
in the context of costly life-prolonging drugs. The appraisal
committees thus now explicitly consider the ‘magnitude of the
additional weight that would need to be assigned to the QALY
benefits… for the cost-effectiveness of the technology to fall
within the current threshold range’ [14]. This guideline, spe-
cific in terms of applicable interventions and open in terms of
what weights might be considered appropriate, might be a first
step in defining more general rules regarding equity weights.
In response to the equity problem, the Dutch have
developed a decision-making framework that uses equity
weights in defining the basic benefits package. Its primary
criteria (proposed in 1991) are necessity, effectiveness, and
efficiency [15]. The first refers to a notion of equity based
on the need for medical intervention; the latter two refer to
the merits of the intervention itself [16]. The three criteria
inform the decision for including an intervention in the
benefits package. Equity weights thus are intended to be an
integral part of rather than exceptions to the rule. In this
context, broad consensus appears to exist for using a par-
ticular operationalization of necessity as basis for equity
weighting, i.e., the concept of proportional shortfall [16–
19]. Although choosing a specific equity principle may lead
to a more systematic and transparent way of using equity
weights to set priorities in the Dutch health care system, it
also requires justification.
The Dutch and UK experiences suggest that including
equity concerns in practice is not straightforward. Arriving
at a systematic consideration raises two important ques-
tions: (i) Which equity principle(s) are used to base QALY
weights on? (ii) How can we derive practically applicable
QALY weights that are in line with the chosen princi-
ple(s)? These difficult and inherently normative questions
complicate the formalization of equity concerns.
To our knowledge, the Netherlands is the first country
where decision makers and health economists have been
involved in a joint effort to formulate an equity principle
and develop a model for putting it into practice. Although
the concept of proportional shortfall is not yet firmly
implemented, that does appear to be the ultimate goal.
Evaluating the proportional shortfall concept and the sup-
port for it in more detail is therefore directly relevant to the
Dutch situation as well as other countries currently strug-
gling with the formalization of equity concerns for priority
setting in health care.
In this article, we will evaluate the proportional shortfall
concept as used in the Dutch health care context, with a
focus on the above-mentioned research questions on
QALY weighting within the context of a chosen principle.
Economic evaluation and equity
Equity weights are integrated into economic evaluations to
adequately consider costs and benefits. The common decision
rule for economic evaluations is shown in Eq. 1 [20]:
VQALYi  DQALYi  D cos ts [ 0; ð1Þ
where VQALYi denotes the monetary value society attaches to a
QALY of type i and the subscript i is used to distinguish QALY
gains according to some equity principle. DQALYi represents
the number of type i QALYs gained; Dcosts are the associated
costs. Both are derived relative to some relevant comparator.
Accordingly, the term VQALYi * DQALYi reflects the benefits
related to the intervention. Put simply, Eq. 1 indicates that
incremental benefits of the intervention need to outweigh its
incremental costs to be eligible for funding.
In common economic evaluations, however, the mone-
tary value component in the benefits is not included in the
equation. Rather the focus is only on DQALYi (commonly
without any distinction between QALYs, following ‘a
QALY is a QALY no matter who gets it’) and Dcosts. This
means that common economic evaluations in the field of
health care do not directly address VQALYi . As such, these
analyses are basically partial economic evaluations. This is
easily demonstrated by reordering Eq. 1:
D cos ts
DQALYi
\VQALYi ; ð2Þ
where the costs per QALY gained of type i have to be
lower than the societal value attached to that particular type
of QALY in order to be eligible for funding. Only then a
common cost-effectiveness or cost-utility analysis becomes
a full economic evaluation as noted in Eq. 1. (It should be
noted that irrespective of how QALYs, costs, and poten-
tially the value of QALYs are derived, the equivalence
between a common cost-benefit analysis and the decision
rule based on a cost-utility analysis may still be questioned
[21, 22]. Also note, that a fuller discussion on decision
rules, under different assumptions regarding decision con-
texts (e.g. fixed budgets) and goals (e.g. focusing on health
or the consumption value of health) is provided by Claxton
et al. [23].
108 E. J. van de Wetering et al.
123
Commonly, one threshold is set for all QALYs,
regardless of the context in which they are gained. How-
ever, in line with Eq. 2, different cost-effectiveness ratios
may be acceptable for different types of QALYs gained if
the value of a QALY is allowed to vary, for instance, on the
basis of the disease or beneficiary characteristics. If so,
rather than having one threshold value for all QALYs, we
have a range whose endpoints are defined by the lowest and
highest possible values attached to a gained QALY in a
particular context. These different contexts may well refer
to notions of equity. It should be noted that such a practice
is equal to keeping the threshold value constant but
attaching ‘equity weights’ to the QALY gains on the left-
hand side of Eq. 2. This implicitly ensures the use of an
appropriate threshold value since the equity weights may
simply be regarded as the relative values of different
QALYs. In the Dutch context, the former approach is
taken, i.e., different threshold values are used when the
burden of illness is high (e.g., acute life-threatening dis-
eases) or low (e.g., toenail fungus). The latter approach
appears to have been adopted for life-prolonging drugs in
the UK, i.e., keeping the threshold fixed but weighting
QALY gains.
To illustrate that one can either vary the threshold values
or attach equity weights to QALYs, we use a hypothetical
example in which the QALY value is allowed to vary
between young and old. For children, the value is highest,
say 1QALY = €100,000. For people aged 90 and over, the
value is lowest, say 1QALY = €5,000. Let the reference
value of a QALY be that of a 40-year-old, or €40,000. One
way to judge a CE ratio of gains in children is to compare
the CE ratio to the threshold line running from 5,000 to
100,000, where for this intervention the high endpoint is
relevant. Alternatively, ‘equity weights’ can be used to
adjust the CE ratio itself, which can be judged against the
common threshold of 40,000. In this example, the equity
weight of QALYs for children relative to the 40-year-old
reference group is 2.5 (vchildren/v40 year olds = 100,000/
40,000). Thus, in order to use equity weights appropriately,
we (implicitly) compare the relative values of different
QALY gains to some reference group with the standard
threshold. Subsequently, such equity weights can be mul-
tiplied with the QALY gains in the CE ratio (i.e., DC/
2.5 * DE), which indirectly corrects the threshold value
used.
The above demonstrates how using a flexible threshold
is basically equal to attaching appropriate equity weights to
different QALYs and comparing them to a single, relevant
threshold. In that sense, the Dutch and UK approaches are
similar, albeit the UK approach currently seems to be used
in only a few specific circumstances. A crucial question,
however, is which equity principle should guide the deri-
vation or evaluation of equity weights (research question
(i)). To this end, we next discuss the well-known principles
of fair innings and prospective health, followed by dis-
cussion of the principle selected in the Dutch context,
proportional shortfall.
Fair innings and prospective health
Which (combination of) equity concept(s) is most suitable
for equity weighting? Several have been proposed even
more equity concepts are imaginable [24–26]. A problem is
that improved equality with one particular definition of
equity may be (necessarily) accompanied by greater
inequalities in the context of a different definition [27].
Selecting one (or more) principle(s) to guide the derivation
or evaluation of equity weights is thus important and not
straightforward. Two important principles are fair innings
and prospective health. Fair innings, roughly speaking,
strives for equity in lifetime health, while prospective
health is more concerned with people’s health expectations,
regardless of experienced health. An aspect both principles
share is that their basis is found within the health domain,
i.e., they both focus on health characteristics of beneficia-
ries, not on aspects like gender or income. The principles
differ, however, in that one strives to equalize lifetime
health and the other prospective health.
The fair innings approach, advocated by Williams [24],
is based on the assumption that everyone is entitled to some
‘normal’ span of life or health achievement. Anyone failing
to achieve this has in some sense been disadvantaged in
terms of lifetime health, while anyone getting more than
this is living on ‘borrowed time’ [24]. This assumption
implies that QALY gains in people who have had their fair
innings should be valued lower than QALY gains in people
who are expected to get less than their fair innings. Thus,
the equity weights depend on the expected lifetime QALY
total, therefore also considering past health losses and age
is a key element (as proxy for lifetime health achievement),
resulting in higher weights for QALY gains in relatively
young persons and lower ones for those in relatively older
persons.
In contrast, the principle of prospective health bases
equity weights on the expected QALY profile of a person
in the case of no treatment. This aligns with an alternative
definition of need, namely, expected ill health over the
remaining years of life [28]. Prospective health considers
the expected health (including death) in future years in the
case of non-intervention and distributes QALY gains ini-
tially to those with the worst prognosis if left untreated
[28]. The approach appears to be related to the Rule of
Rescue, which implies that rescuing identifiable individuals
facing avoidable death should have priority over other
types of care [29, 30]. While prospective health
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incorporates non-identifiable individuals and non-life-
threatening conditions, both prioritize people with poor
health prospects.
The different perspectives of fair innings and prospec-
tive health obviously result in different equity weights. As
seen in Table 1, group A faces immediate death and group
B has one remaining QALY. However, group B consists of
younger persons who, consequently, have enjoyed fewer
QALYs than persons in group A. Adhering to the equity
principle of prospective health, group A would have pri-
ority because they face immediate death. The fair innings
principle, on the other hand, would prioritize group B since
it comprises younger people, or, put more precisely, it has a
lower lifetime quality-adjusted life expectancy [28, 31, 32].
A number of empirical studies have found at least some
public support for both the principles of fair innings and
prospective health [1, 2, 33], although it may depend on the
context of the decision [34]. As mentioned, age is impor-
tant to the fair innings principle. Both Dolan et al. [1] and
Schwappach [2] have found in their reviews that the
majority of studies reveal support for giving less weight to
health gains in older people, but Schwappach argues that
age preferences vary across countries, study designs, and
context. Additionally, both reviews note that age weighting
may reflect underlying rationales other than the fair innings
principle. For example, people may prefer health gains in
young people because they expect them to last longer.
Separation of the different rationales places specific
requirements on the design of studies, which are not always
met. Furthermore, Shah’s recent review [33] indicates that
the public prefers to prioritize individuals in poorer health
rather than those in better health without treatment, even if
it results in lower overall health gains [1, 2]. Shah, how-
ever, [33] emphasized that the strength of the support
should be estimated more precisely to gain a true reflection
of it.
There appears to be little evidence showing that either
equity principle reflects the distributional preferences of
society completely or one fully lacks support. In that
regard, we should note that people may in fact adhere to
both principles: someone may feel that (holding other
things constant, i.e., health prospects) young people should
receive priority over older people and, at the same time,
feel that (holding other things constant, i.e., age) people
with worse health prospects should receive priority over
those with better health prospects. In the Dutch context,
therefore, the equity principle proposed was a measure of
severity labelled ‘proportional shortfall’, which contained
elements of both fair innings and prospective health [37].
We should note that the Dutch decision, while delibera-
tively taken and explicitly justified, should be seen as a
first, pragmatic attempt to find an equity principle that is
practically applicable and supported by the public.
The principle of proportional shortfall
The concept of proportional shortfall adopts the normative
viewpoint that priority should be given to those patients
who lose the greatest proportion of their remaining health
expectancy due to some illness if the illness remains
untreated. In other words, measurements of inequalities in
health should concentrate on the fraction of QALYs lost
due to illness, relative to remaining life expectancy. Pro-
portional shortfall (PS) can be measured on a scale from 0
(no health loss) to 1 (complete loss of remaining health)
using the following formula:
PS ¼ Disease related QALY loss
Remaining QALY expectation in absence of the disease
;
ð3Þ
where the denominator reflects the remaining QALY
expectation in normal health, which could, for example, be
determined on the basis of the age and gender. The
numerator presents the QALY loss, which is determined by
deducting a patient’s QALY expectancy given the disease
without treatment from the remaining QALY expectancy in
absence of the disease. The proportional shortfall is 1 for
all patients who face a threat of immediate death, irre-
spective of their age. Since they will lose 100% of their
remaining life expectancy, they all receive equal weight.
Likewise, if a young patient with a normal QALY expec-
tation of 40 loses 20 QALYs, he or she will get the same
equity weight as an older patient with a QALY expectation
of 2 who stands to lose 1 QALY: both patients lose 50% of
their remaining life expectancy. Since proportional short-
fall is a relative measure, both younger and older individ-
uals can experience a low or high proportional shortfall.
For another example, a 30-year-old losing 1 of 40
remaining QALYs would receive low treatment priority (1/
40 = 0.025), while a 70-year-old losing 1 of 5 remaining
QALYs would receive higher priority (1/5 = 0.2).
Table 1 Illustrating fair
innings and prospective health
Patient group QALY consumed QALYs remaining
(prospective health)
Expected QALY
total (fair innings)
A (immediate death) 60 0 60
B (younger) 40 1 41
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Whereas fair innings and prospective health equalize
absolute health outcomes in terms of total and future
health, proportional shortfall proposes to equalize relative
attainments. By doing so, the concept combines elements
of both fair innings and prospective health [37]. In accor-
dance with fair innings, proportional shortfall is concerned
with disease-related QALY loss; at the same time, in
accordance with prospective health, it takes the remaining
QALY expectation without treatment into account [35].
Therefore, the principle may be perceived as an interme-
diate position between fair innings and prospective health.
Obviously, this does not necessarily mean that propor-
tional shortfall is in any sense ‘better’ than the other two.
Its use must be justified, both normatively and empirically.
A limitation to normative justification is that unlike, say,
fair innings, the concept is not derived from a particular
theory about distributive justice. Instead, normative argu-
ments for both prospective health and fair innings are
assumed to be compelling; thus, given that both principles
result in different prioritizations, a reconciliation of or
trade-off between the two is required. While balancing two
principles that appear to have some normative and empir-
ical support may intuitively make sense, whether the
resulting combination has the same (or even a better) moral
status than the individual principles themselves remains
questionable [36].
One convincing argument for this (and thus proportional
shortfall) may be whether the latter reflects societal pref-
erences better than either of its underlying principles.
Evidence is thus far inconclusive, as is the only head-to-
head comparison of all three concepts in which Stolk et al.
[31] performed an experiment in a sample of Dutch health
policy makers, researchers, and students to explore support
for the individual principles. Observed rank orders of ten
conditions were compared with rank orders based on the
three equity principles. While both fair innings and pro-
portional shortfall were highly correlated with the observed
rank order, rank orderings based on prospective health
showed only a moderate correlation coefficient with the
respondents’ ranking. Fair innings seemed to slightly out-
perform proportional shortfall, but neither offered a fully
accurate description of societal preferences: There were
always cases where the predicted rank ordering diverged
from the observed. It was therefore concluded that more
(elaborate) research was required before firm conclusions
could be drawn about which concept best reflects societal
preferences.
Despite the limited empirical and theoretical evidence to
support proportional shortfall, broad consensus exists in the
Netherlands to use it for equity weighting. The choice was
partly pragmatic, subject to possible adjustment according
to incoming evidence and ongoing experience. From the
outset, it was obvious that the adoption of any equity
principle would not be without problems. To avoid per-
fection becoming the enemy of the good, however, efforts
were made to operationalize proportional shortfall for use
in practice. We highlight this in the following section,
while addressing the issue of how practically applicable
QALY weights can be derived in line with the chosen
principle and how they can subsequently be used in deci-
sion making on the allocation of scarce health care
resources.
The practice of proportional shortfall
As indicated, three criteria have been particularly impor-
tant in the delineation of the basic benefits package in the
Dutch context: necessity, effectiveness, and efficiency.
While proposed and well received about two decades ago
[15], adopting them for practical use has proven difficult
and controversial. Effectiveness, which has always been a
dominant criterion in the health care sector, was least
controversial but not efficiency, which is nonetheless
increasingly used and accepted. It has been operationalized
primarily through cost-effectiveness and cost-utility anal-
yses, and most widely applied in the context of new
pharmaceuticals. ‘Necessity,’ while intuitively important,
eluded definition and measurement and thus remained
barely applied as a (systematic) selection criterion in
practice until 2002. Attempts to exclude services based on
the criterion of necessity commonly provoked political or
societal debate. Proportional shortfall was introduced to
provide a more systematic and quantitative definition of
necessity, which also solved its problem of dichotomy:
interventions were deemed either necessary or unnecessary
with no in-between. This proved virtually impossible as a
proper definition of necessity, and a clear and universal
cutoff point between unnecessary and necessary (or, for
that matter, cost-effective and cost-ineffective) care was
lacking. Mostly, there would be (groups of) patients for
whom it would be difficult to label the intervention as
unnecessary or cost-ineffective [37].
The introduction of proportional shortfall made it pos-
sible to quantify the necessity criterion and to integrate it
with or relate it to results regarding (cost-)effectiveness in
the decision-making framework. Basically, the threshold of
cost per QALY (i.e., the value of the QALY) was allowed
to vary with the necessity of the intervention, creating a
decision framework in line with Eq. 2. The idea was that
society is willing to pay more for an intervention, given the
underlying proportional shortfall, considered more neces-
sary [38]. Put differently, a less favorable cost-effective-
ness ratio is acceptable for an intervention in the context of
a greater proportional shortfall, i.e., when the treatment is
deemed to be more necessary, and unacceptable when the
Balancing equity and efficiency 111
123
associated proportional shortfall is low. This decision-
making framework is illustrated in Fig. 1.
While the framework is increasingly supported [17, 19], it
is unclear how it has affected decisions and it is likely that it is
currently used predominantly as a conceptual framework. One
reason may be that it is relatively unclear how the threshold of
costs per QALY gained varies with proportional shortfall. The
equity weights placed on the different QALY gains (the value
of gained QALYs relative to the underlying proportional
shortfall) remain uncertain, although existing evidence may
inform policy makers to some extent (see for example [41]). In
that sense, the threshold and margins in Fig. 1 are largely
tentative. Recently, a maximum threshold height of some
€80,000 has been suggested [17, 39], although the choice
lacks sound basis [40]. Furthermore, it has been suggested that
social willingness to pay for QALY gains in the case of a very
low burden of disease (proportional shortfall less than 10%)
might not exist at all in the context of a collectively funded
health insurance scheme (which explains the dotted threshold
line near the origin of the graph in Fig. 1).1 The shape of the
curve would ultimately be based on adequately derived Dutch
evidence regarding the relative valuations of QALY gains in
different proportional shortfall contexts. A linear relationship
has thus been proposed as a pragmatic starting point [18] but,
even under this assumption, we need to be able to adequately
judge the proportional shortfall in different circumstances to
use the framework in practice.
The framework is thus currently more conceptual than
prescriptive in assessing health care intervention. Sup-
porting this may be the fact that the shortcomings of pro-
portional shortfall have barely been discussed. As
highlighted by the fair innings and prospective health
principles, not all consequences of the proportional short-
fall principle may be in line with common conceptions of
an equitable distribution of health care. Perhaps the most
counterintuitive implication of the principle of proportional
shortfall is that anyone facing imminent death should
receive the maximum necessity score of 1, since all
remaining health will be lost. This seems hard to defend
when comparing between patients that differ substantially
in age. Indeed, proportional shortfall assigns a necessity
score of 1 when all remaining health is lost, regardless of
the absolute number of life-years lost. The principle is
indifferent to whether a 3-year-old is losing 80 years or an
80-year-old is losing 3 years (when both expected to
become 83 otherwise), but in practice, many people judge
intervention to be more necessary in the former situation
[40], making it conceivable that the result conflicts with
society’s equity principles. Likewise, since women have a
higher life expectancy than men, an absolute QALY loss at
a certain age will have more weight for men than women
(for instance when comparing breast cancer and prostate
cancer in certain age groups), and it is unclear whether this
would be judged equitable [35, 42, 43].
Moreover, it became apparent that the operationalization of
proportional shortfall required numerous normative choices
that have important impacts on final outcomes. Coming to
practically applicable proportional shortfall scores that are in
line with public preferences is therefore not straightforward
[35]. For instance, the calculation of proportional shortfall in
preventive treatments requires clear normative choices. Con-
sidering that many who receive preventive treatment will never
experience the negative health effects precluded by the inter-
vention, which group is relevant? While the treated group may
be relevant in a cost-utility analysis of a preventive interven-
tion, it may not be when calculating the proportional shortfall
of the underlying disease. Calculating proportional shortfall
over the entire group would result in a very low average pro-
portional shortfall since only a small percentage of the treated
group would actually experience a health loss. This in turn
results in low priority for (primary) preventive action, but the
very aim of the intervention is to avoid health loss in those who
would experience it without the preventive intervention. Then,
it seems reasonable to calculate the proportional shortfall in the
subgroup only, resulting in a higher proportional shortfall and
threshold value. (The latter position is taken in the Nether-
lands.) Consequently, normative choices are necessary in
defining the relevant group in which to determine proportional
shortfall, which does not necessarily coincide with the popu-
lation involved in the economic evaluation.
The timeframe for calculating proportional shortfall is
another issue. Should the onset of preventive treatment be
the starting point from which to calculate proportional
shortfall? Or should it be the moment at which the negative
health effects would have actually occurred? Obviously,
0
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1 Asserting that a disease has a low necessity of treatment is in itself
difficult. A relatively small health loss may be due to something
severe during a small period of time or something relatively mild but
chronic. Such profiles may be evaluated differently, as discussed later
in the text.
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the shorter timeframe will increase the proportional short-
fall. Consider, for example, that a preventive intervention
reduces a risk factor that, left untreated, results in death
20 years hence, reducing lifespan by 10 years. Until the
moment of death, patients are without health loss. Calcu-
lating proportional shortfall starting from treatment time
means that the first 20 years are in health and only the final
10 years are lost, resulting in a proportional shortfall of
33%. Calculating from the moment of illness, the propor-
tional shortfall is 100% (since then 10 of the remaining 10
life-years are lost). In the Netherlands, it has been argued
that since society is likely to feel quite different about acute
death than about a predicted (or certain) death in 20 years,
calculating proportional shortfall from the moment of
treatment would be more appropriate. Again, this is a
normative choice, with substantial influence on results.
An additional problem exists in handling episodic dis-
eases. An average proportional shortfall of 0.04 can result
from a stable yet mild condition that causes a loss of 0.04
per day as well as from a disease that is primarily latent (no
health loss for 350 days per year), but leaves the patient in
agony during the episode (a loss of 1.0 during the
remainder of the year). In the current operationalization of
proportional shortfall, such episodes are simply averaged
over the full year (as in normal QALY calculations).
However, the appropriateness and justification of such a
simple method of transforming health profiles into pro-
portional shortfall scores can be disputed. Can we really
conclude on such a basis that a certain illness has a modest
severity? It appears that the variation over time may be
important here too; yet, how could or should this be
included in the calculation of proportional shortfall?
The above illustrates that not just the choice of an equity
principle is normative; putting whatever it is into practice
requires additional normative choices. Whatever the cho-
sen principle, it appears inevitable that counterintuitive
prioritizations may result in certain circumstances. Clearly,
therefore, decision makers should be aware of additional
and potentially conflicting equity considerations.
Discussion
Explicit inclusion of equity weights in the decision-making
framework for allocation decisions in the health care sector
has become increasingly important. A pragmatic start has
been made in the Netherlands with the principle of pro-
portional shortfall, which adopts the normative viewpoint
that when people stand to lose relatively more of their
remaining health, a higher cost per QALY threshold is
appropriate. It thus quantifies the criterion of necessity in
the Dutch decision-making framework. The higher the
proportional shortfall, the more necessary the intervention.
This article highlights that the approach is not without
problems. Both the normative basis and empirical support
warrant further study. Of particular concern are situations
where the consequences of proportional shortfall diverge
from public preferences. For example, it seems hard to
defend that avoiding a full loss of all remaining health would
be equally important when the choice concerns either a very
large or small absolute QALY loss, i.e., young and old people,
respectively. Whether proportional shortfall adequately
reflects societal preferences in such cases is uncertain and
information on the circumstances of misalignment is pivotal
in refining the principle and its employment.
We also highlighted that operationalizing proportional
shortfall (or of any equity principle for that matter)
involves normative choices that can have a profound effect
on outcomes, like in the case of preventive interventions. It
is crucial that these normative choices are as widely dis-
cussed as those embedded in cost-effectiveness analyses.
The highlighted shortcomings of proportional shortfall
clearly should not be misinterpreted as a plea to replace it
with a different equity concept such as fair innings. Indeed,
whatever principle is chosen, similar shortcomings and
normative choices will arise in transitioning from principle
to practice. Since different notions of equity—all of which
have some support in some instances—will always conflict
in certain circumstances [27], conflicts with societal pref-
erences will be inevitable. At this moment, there is no
conclusive evidence that another equity principle reflects
the distributional preferences of society better than pro-
portional shortfall. It seems more appropriate, given the
relatively strong (political) support for the equity concept
of proportional shortfall in the Dutch context, to further
test, develop, and refine the principle and its operational-
ization. For example, one might consider incorporating age
weights in proportional shortfall in order to better reflect
societal preferences.2 Obviously, this requires more and
detailed research on relevant societal preferences as well as
public debate. Improving the quantification of necessity
will most likely be a lengthy and difficult process.
The current situation, while perhaps far from perfect,
may be seen as an important and perhaps essential step in
the development of an appropriate set of equity weights in
the Netherlands. The associated quantification of necessity
should improve consistency and transparency in the deci-
sion-making process. Meanwhile, experience from the
systematic use of proportional shortfall will potentially
improve the principle and its practical use.
Besides proportional shortfall or health profiles of ben-
eficiaries in general, many other factors may be relevant for
decision making in relation to equity considerations.
2 Obviously, this also depends on whether one wishes to consider
societal preferences to be a good guide for normative choices.
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Reviews by Dolan et al. [1] and Schwappach [2] have
identified numerous factors besides health attainments or
prospects that appear to influence the relative valuation of
QALYs, such as prior health consumption, culpability, age,
having dependents, and socioeconomic status. More recent
studies have added to this field [33, 44], but so far most involve
small and unrepresentative samples, the studies are quite
context specific, and findings are sometimes contradictory. It
seems difficult at this stage to be conclusive regarding the
relative weights given to these considerations in an empirical
sense. While it may be interesting and helpful to analyze such
additional equity concerns in relation to proportional shortfall,
such empirical work should coincide with normative debates
regarding whether such additional (or alternative) concerns
should be included in the decision-making process. For
instance, even if the public (on average) considers culpability
important in fair allocation of health care resources, wanting
to institutionalize such sentiments is questionable if only
because Dutch legislation prohibits it.
Another challenge in the Dutch context is further
quantification of the decision model. Currently, the QALY
value is unclear, and how it varies with different propor-
tional shortfall percentages and which equity weights
should be placed on various QALY gains needs to be
investigated further. To use the decision-making frame-
work in practice, the (relative) values assigned to QALY
gains for different levels of proportional shortfall have to
be elicited, for instance, from the public. Different methods
have been used such as willingness to pay, person trade-
off, or discrete choice analysis [3]. Which technique best
captures the preferences of society may depend on the
research question and whether relative weights of various
equity concerns will be investigated simultaneously in
combined trade-offs.
In conclusion, although proportional shortfall provides
important information for decision makers by acceptably
quantifying the necessity of treatment in the Dutch context,
it clearly does not perfectly capture societal preferences.
Sufficient room should be left in the decision-making
framework and process to judge whether the equity weights
accurately reflect the public preferences in particular cir-
cumstances and to improve on principles and practice if so
indicated. More generally, the Dutch experience with
equity considerations in relation to economic evaluations
has given insight into the difficulties related to the choice
for and operationalization of an equity concept for the
allocation of scarce health care resources. Although the
Dutch experiences are based on the concept of proportional
shortfall, similar issues are likely to occur when opting for
other equity concepts. Therefore, the Dutch experiences
can provide helpful lessons for countries currently strug-
gling with the important issue of formalization of equity
concerns in priority setting in health care.
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